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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
~-~0000000---
RONALD Do ELLIS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
SOCIAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT OF 
THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF 
LATTER-DAY SAINTS; LDS SOCIAL 
SERVICES, et al~, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
---0000000---
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Case No. 16881 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff, Ronald D. Ellis, commenced a habeas corpus 
action in the District Court in and for Salt Lake County by 
filing a Verified Complaint, January 4, 1980, alleging that he 
was the natural father of a male child born out of wedlock in 
Salt Lake County, Utah, on or about December 17, 1979, (actual 
birthdate was December 15, 1979) seeking a determination that the 
liberty of the baby was "illegally restrained" and that he, the 
putative father, be awarded custody, which complaint was later 
amendede 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Following a hearing before the Honorable Bryant H. 
Croft, the Amended Complaint was dismissed with prejudice January 
21, 1980 on the motion of defendant L.D.S. Social Services. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiff-Appellant seeks to have this Court 
reverse the District Court's Dismissal and remand the matter with 
instructions to determine Mr. Ellis's fitness to have cu~tody of 
the child. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondents agree with the statement in Appellant's 
brief that, for the purposes of this appeal, the allegations of 
the verified Complaint must be considered true. Appellant's 
statement of facts, however, contains several gratuitous 
additions to the verified Complaint among which are the 
following: "neither (natural parent) has lived within Utah at any 
time material to this action": "the (natural mother) has since 
(the termination of the engagement) consistently refused Mr. 
Ellis's proposals of marriage": "immediately prior to her 
delivery, (the natural mother) left California and came to Utah"; 
"through a bishop of the L.D.S. Church in California, Mr. Ellis 
learned of (the natural mother's) whereabouts and the birth of 
his son": "during the week of his son's birth, Mr. Ellis and his 
California attorney contacted L.D.S. Social Services and informed 
them both of his paternity and of his desire to support and have 
custody of his son"; "L.D.S. Social Services failed to 
advise him (the natural father) of any steps which would have to 
be undertaken to protect his parental rights". 
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According to the verified Complaint the California 
attorney's contact with the L.D.S. Social Services occurred "on 
or about December 21, 1979", a date subsequent to the 
relinquishment of the baby to the child placement agency, which 
relinquishment occurred December 19, 1979 (R.23). Appellant's 
attempt in the Statement of Facts to negate any contact of the 
natural mother with the State of Utah goes beyond the language of 
the Verified Amended Complaint. 
As will be observed from the Stipulation Regarding Stay 
of Adoption and Expedited Appeal, the L.D.S. Social Services has 
not consented in writing to the adoption of the infant, although 
it has been placed in the home of prospective adoptive parents. 
No Petition for Adoption has been filed by the prospective 
adoptive parents and none will be filed pending the Appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
The Appellant in the District Court failed to plead or 
demonstrate timely compliance with Title 78-30-4(3) Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 as amended and particularly (b) thereof which 
provides 
"The notice (of claim of paternity) may be 
registered prior to the birth of the child 
but must be registered prior to the date the 
illegitimate child is relinquis~ed or pl~ced 
with an agency licensed to provide adoption 
services or prior to the filing of a petition 
by a person with whom the mother has placed 
the child for adoption. The notice shall be 
signed by the registrant and shall include 
his name and address, the name and last known 
address of the mother, and either the birth 
date of the child or the probable month and 
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year of the expected birth of the child. The 
Bureau of Vital Statistics shall maintain a 
confidential registry for this purpose." 
The Affidavit and Release to the adoption agency was executed by 
the natural mother December 19, 1979, and Mr. Ellis failed to 
file his claim of paternity until January 2, 1980. 
I 
I. THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAS NOT 
BEEN DENIED DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL 
PROTECTION OF LAW GUARANTEED TO HIM 
UNDER THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTIONS. 
Respondents do not dispute the contention made in 
Appellant's brief that the putative father has an interest in 
retaining custody of his children which is "cognizable and 
substantial" under the holding of Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 
645, 92 s. Ct. 1208, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551 {1972). That case involved 
the custody of Peter Stanley's two minor illegitimate children 
after the death of their mother. Despite the fact that Stanley 
had lived intermittently with his children and their mother for 
eighteen {18) years and had supported them during that time, he 
~as not considered a "parent" under Illinois law. The relevant 
statute defined "parent" as the mother or father of a legitimate 
child but only the mother of an illegitimate child. "Parents" 
were entitled to a hearing on the question of fitness before 
losing custody of their children, but because he had never 
married the mother, Stanley did not qualify for such a hearing. 
Under Illinois' practice, the only relevant question was whether 
he was the father of legitimate children. The answer was clearly 
no, and so the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that he was not 
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entitled to a hearing in which to establish his fitness. His 
childred were adjudged wards of the courtc 
Stanley appealed to the United States Supreme Court 
which reversed the State Court decision ruling that Illinois' 
"method of presumption" would not be allowed to stand "in the 
light of the fact that Illinois allows married fathers--whether 
divorced, widowed or separated--and mothers--even if unwed-- the 
benefit of the presumption that they are fit to raise their 
childrene" Clearly, the Stanley decision holds that a man who 
has lived with and supported his illegitimate children is 
entitled to a hearing on the question of his fitness before he 
can be denied custodyc Justice White refers to Stanley's 
interest as "that of a man in the children he has sired 
and raised", 405 UeS. at 651 (emphasis added). Shortly after the 
Stanley decision, the Supreme Court indicated that its ruling was 
not limited to cases in which the State intervened to deprive a / 
putative father of custody. A second Illinois case, 
Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan, 9 Ill. App. 3d 260, 292 N. E. 2d 14 5, 
vacated 405 U.S. 1051 (1972) was remanded involving a custody 
dispute between parents of two illegitimate children. In 
addition, the court applied its ruling in Stanley to adoption 
cases in Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services, 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 
N.W. 2d 56, vacated sub. nom. Rothstein v. Lutheran Social 
Services, 405 u.s. 1051 (1972). That case involved a Wisconsin 
father who sought to overturn the adoption of his child after it 
had been granted on the sole consent of the unwed mother. The 
Court directed reconsideration of the case "in light of 
-6-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Stanley ••• and with due consideration for the completion of 
the adoption proceedings and the fact that the child has 
apparently lived with the adoptive family for the intervening 
period of time". 
In the Lewis case the unwed father, seeking custody, 
filed for a declaration of his parental rights and duties. The 
initial court action took place in December, 1968, five months 
after the baby's birth and four months after the mother had 
relinquished the child for adoption. ~he father challenged the 
Wisconsin statute that required only the mother's consent to 
adoption without notice to the father. The father lost but two 
years later the United States Supreme Court remanded. The 
Wisconsin court then issued a new post-Stanley decision, (Lewis 
v. Lutheran Social Services of Wisconsin, 59 Wis. 2d 1, 207 N.W. 
2d 826 (1973]) in which it held as a matter of law that both 
unwed parents were entitled to notice of the proposed adoption 
and both were required to consent, unless their parental rights 
had been legally terminated. The case was sent back to the trial 
court for factual findings regarding the parents' consents and 
rights. Finally in April, 1975, three years after Stanley and 
nearly seven years after ~he child's birth, the fourth and 
apparently final decision was rendered, Lewis v. Lutheran Social 
Services of Wisconsin, 68 Wis. 2d 36, 227 N.W. 2d 643 (1975). 
The Wisconsin trial court concluded and the Supreme Court 
affirmed that the father had forfeited his rights by abandoning 
the child before it was born (emphasis added). 
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The statute which Illinois enacted following Stanley 
has been criticized as "an overreaction to Stanley .... entirely 
understandable in view of the reaction of the United States 
Supreme Court to the legal status of the unwed father in 
Illinois", see Barron, "Notice to the Unwed Father and 
Termination of Rights: Implementing Stanley v. Illinois," 9 Fam. 
L. Q. 527. The reaction, or overreaction, took the form of, 
first, including all unwed fathers in the statutory definition of 
"parent" Ill. Ann .. Stat. Ch. 4, Sec. 9.1-lE (Smith-Hurd, 197S) 
and second, requiring notice of a proposed adoption and either 
consent or termination of rights by all such fathers, Ill. Ann. 
Stat .. Ch .. 4, Sec. 9.l-8(a), 9 .. 1012(a) (Smith-Hurd, 1975). These 
statutes have been criticized as creating unmanageable practical 
difficulties in that the state assumes the burden of locating the 
putative father. In seeking to make its adoptions invulnerable 
to attack on due process grounds it requires that notice be given 
to all fathers, known and unknown, concerned and indifferent 
(emphasis added). 
Some states have attempted to comply with Stanley's 
guidelines by shifting the initial burdens of identification and 
location onto the father or mother. For instance, Colorado 
requires notice only to fathers who have supported the child or 
acknowledged paternity in writing, or whose name appears on the 
birth certificate, Colo. Rev. Stat. Title 19, Sec. 1-103(21) 
(1973}. 
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The cases thus far noted, Stanley, Vanderlaan,· and 
Lewis, all involved fathers who had initiated legal proceedings. 
The difficulties of notice to those fathers who do not come 
forward were dealt with in Stanley only in a footnote in which 
the court noted, "if unwed fathers in the main do not care about 
the disposition of their children, they will not appear to demand 
hearings", 405 U.S. at 657 n. 11$ It could be argued, therefore, 
that under Stanley the father has the initial burden of appearing 
so that he may be kept informed. The difficulty is the problem 
of fathers who are unaware either of their paternity, actual or 
impending, or of the adoption hearing. States that do not 
actively reach out to notify such fathers have decided that the 
biological link alone, clearly much weaker than the on-going 
relationship with his children of the father in Stanley, does not 
create such an "essential" interest that state protection is 
guaranteed, particularly where other interests such as speedy 
placement of a child in a permanent home may be affected. 
Wisconsin's revised statute which went into effect 
June, 1974,· defined "parent" as "a person adjudged in a court 
proceeding to be a natural father", (Wis. Stat. Ann. Sec. 48.02 
(Il), W. Supp. 1976). Wiscons"in allows "any person(s) claiming. 
to be the father" who has not acquired legal status as a "parent" 
to file a declaration of his interest in his child at any time 
prior to termination of his rights. The declaration is filed 
with the Department of Health and Social Services, and must 
contain the mother's name and address, and the date or expected 
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date of the child's birth, as well as a statement that the 
claimant has "reason to believe that he may be the father of the 
child". The Department sends a copy of the declaration to the 
mother who may file a response. The mother's failure to respond 
is not, however, an admission of the statements in the 
declaration and the mere filing does not extend parental rights 
to the claimant. The filing entitles the putative father only to 
notice and an opportunity to appear in court proceedings 
affecting the child. 
Notice is also required in Wisconsin to a putative 
father who has not filed a declaration but who has been adjudged 
the father in a court proceeding or one "who may be the. natural 
father ••• and is living in a familial relationship with the 
child", Wis. Stat. Ann. Sec. 48.195 (West. Supp. 1976). Finally, 
the right to notice of a proceeding to terminate parental rights 
is given to a person "alleged to the court to be the natural 
father", Wis. Stat. Ann. Sec. 48.42(3) (West. Supp. 1976). To 
this end, the court "shall make inquiry of the mother as to the 
identity of the natural father", ibid, Sec. 48.42(3). ·Wisconsin 
thus limits its notice to fathers who have been identified 
formally or informally, or who have come forward in some way. 
Utah's statute most closely resembles that of Michigan 
which provided: "Release for purposes of adoption given only by 
a mother of a child born out of wedlock is sufficient and rights 
of any putati,re father shall not be recognized thereafter in any 
court unless the person claiming to be the father of the child 
has filed with the probate court prior to the birth of the child, 
-10-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a notice of intent to claim paternity" Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. Sec. 
710.31 et seq. (Supp. 1972) which has since been repealed and a 
much more complex scheme inaugurated, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. Sec 
710.31 et. seq. (Supp. 1976). The present Michigan statute makes 
no provision for any but personal service, it contains specific 
guidelines and limitations on the rights of the recognized 
natural father to obtain custody and it emphasizes early 
procedures encouraging the father to claim or disclaim interest 
before the child's birth. Michigan allows the father to take the 
initiative by providing that "a person claiming under oath to be 
the father of the child" may file a notice of intent to claim 
paternity before the child's birth. Such filing entitles the 
presumed father to receive notice of the hearing at which 
parental rights are to be determined or terminated. The unwed 
mother may also initiate notice and is encouraged to do so. The 
notice of intent to release her consent is to be served on the 
named putative father personally by any officer or person 
authorized to serve process of the court and advises the putative 
father of his right to file a notice of intent to claim paternity 
and informs him that failure to so file before the birth or 
expected confinement whichever is later will constitute a waiver 
of further notice, a denial of interest, and a termination of all 
rights to the child. Following the birth of the child, the court 
holds a hearing as soon as practical to determine the father's 
identity and to determine his rights. Notice of the hearing must 
be given to 1) those who filed an intent to claim paternity, 2) 
those who were not served with the Notice of Intent to Release or 
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Consent at least thirty days before the anticipated birth and, 3) 
those who were not served at all but who the court has reason to 
believe may be the father of the childe Notice to an unknown 
father is not required at all~ If a known father was properly 
se~ved with a Notice of Intent to Release or Consent or received 
(or waived) notice of the hearinq, the court may terminate his 
rights if he has 1) failed to file an intent to claim paternity 
within the specified time, 2) disclaimed paternity, or 3) failed 
to appear at the hearing. If the formally adjudged father is 
present at the hearing, has not lost or waived his rights and 
seeks custody, the statutes set out a procedure attempting to 
discriminate between fathers who have not established a 
relationship with the child and those who have. In the first 
category is the man who has "not established any custodial 
relationship" with the child, or who has not supported the 
pregnant mother and/or child. In such a situation the court must 
investigate the father's ability to care for the child and will 
award custody only if it is found to be in the child's "best 
interest". In the second category are fathers who have 
established a custodial relationship or who have supported the 
mother or child for at least ninety (90} days before receiving 
notice of the hearing. The rights of these fathers are not 
subject to the "best interests" rule, but may be terminated only 
on traditional grounds of parental unfitness, abandonment, etc. 
Michigan law originally required notice only to fathers who have 
filed a Notice of Intent in Probate Court, or were living with 
the mother as husband and wife, while under present law, a father 
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who has taken informal steps to make k:nown his paternity such as 
having his name entered on the birth certificate, informally 
acknowledging the child, taking insurance for the child, etc., is 
given notice and the right to appear and establish his parental 
rights. The Michigan statute as well as that of Utah a~tempts to 
avoid the practical difficulties presented when the identity of 
the father is unknown. Both schemes involve a paternal 
registration system. In effect, the statutes reverse the notice 
burden and although a registered father will receive notice of a 
pending proceeding, he bears the initial responsibility of 
officially asserting his intentions. 
Such registration laws aim to accomplish several 
objectives. First, they obviate the need for time consuming 
efforts to locate the father after the birth of the child. Both 
speed and preservation of the mother's anonymity are thereby 
served. Second, they seek to thwart the mother's efforts to 
defeat a father's interest by withholding his name from the 
adoption agency. Registration assures the father of notice. 
Third, by imposing a duty of action on the father, the statute 
operates to sever the interests of those who fail even to make 
themselves aware of the mother's pregnancy. 
The impending b{rth of an illegitimate child carries 
the potential for warning the putative father of the possibility 
of forthcoming proceedings which will affect his rights. As the 
child's procreator, the putative father bears responsibility for 
his offspring's well-being. It should be clear to him. that this 
responsiblity must be assumed, and that his failure to do so will 
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result in the State's assuming responsibility for the childe 
Given this opportunity for knowledge, it is reasonable to permit 
self-information as the unknown putative father's sole means of 
notice. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has distinquished Stanley in 
Quilloin v. Wallcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978). In that case, the 
Court made it clear that a state has the right in custody cases 
involving illegitimate children to distinguish between parents of 
legitimate and parents of illegitimate children. The court noted 
that in the Stanley case the issue involved was between a State 
and the illegitimate father of a child to whom he had acted as a 
father for quite a number of years, who had the greater interest 
over the child absent any type of hearing on the question of 
fitness. In Quilloin, however, the Court was faced only with the 
question of approving an adoption which would "give full 
recognition to a family unit already in existence, a result 
desired by all concerned, except appellant". The Court stated 
"we think appellant's (the natural father's) interests are 
readily distinguishable from those of a separated or divorced 
father, and accordingly believe that the state could permissibly 
give appellant less veto authority than it provides to a married 
father", 434 U.S. at 256. In the Quilloin case the law which was 
being challenged provided that if the child was illegitimate the 
mother was the only recognized parent and was given exclusive 
authority to exercise all parental prerogatives. The court 
upheld that law which is substantially less protective of the 
rights of 'the father of an illegitimate child than is Utah Code 
-14-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Annotated 78-30-4(3). There was, therefore, in Quilloin no 
denial of equal protection, the putative father having had no 
actual or legal custody and, therefore, having never shouldered 
any significant responsibility with respect to the daily 
supervision, education, protection or care of the child, 434 U.S. 
at 256. 
A review of the history of the U.C.A 78-30-4(3) 
discloses that the House Bill was intended to cure the problems 
presented by the Supreme Court ruling in Stanley v. Illinois. It 
was noted that often a father would be unknown, could not be 
found, or would not come forward and the purpose of the bill was 
to protect the rights of natural fathers, at the same time 
requiring the natural father to come foward by filing a Notice of 
Claim of Paternity with the Department of Vital Statistics. (See 
record of House of Representatives, introduction of bill by its 
Sponsor.) The Utah Senate amended 78-30-4 by adding subparagraph 
(3)(c) as follows: 
"Any father of such child who fails to file 
and register his Notice of Claim to Paternity 
and his agreement to support the child shall 
be barred from thereafter bringing or 
maintaining any action to establish his 
paternity of the child. Such failure shall 
further constitute an abandonment of said 
child and a waiver and surrender of any right 
to notice of or to a hearing in any judicial 
proceeding for the adoption of said child and 
the consent of such father to the adootion of 
such child shall not be required." ~ 
Such language clearly reveals the intent of the 
Legislature to place the burden of self-inquiry notice on the 
putative father and evidences the further intent that placements 
be speedy, obviating the "state of limbo" in which a child is 
-15-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
placed upon birth where the natural mother consents to its 
release but the natural father has failed to come forward as 
required by the registration system. 
As permitted by the statute, Mr. Ellis could have taken 
steps prior to the birth of the child to register within the 
State of Utah and failed to do so. He delayed doing so until 
eighteen days after the birth of the child and fourteen days 
after the mother relinquished the child to defendant agency. The 
statutory scheme places the burden on plaintiff to keep himself 
informed of the mother's intentions and whereabouts. 
To set aside the registration scheme as a denial of due 
process creates uncertainty in the many adoptions that have been 
taken in reliance on that scheme. 
The trial court in its summation stated the following 
commencing at page 61 of the record: 
The statute says that failure to file the 
acknowledgment constitutes an abandonment of 
the child and a waiver and surrender of any 
right to notice. 
I just finished my responsibilities on 
the division handling adoptions during the 
last six months and each time I conducted an 
adoption hearing involving the adoption of a 
child born out of wedlock, the Certificate of 
Search was required to be filed and was filed 
in which it was certified that the 
examination of the records of the state 
agency showed that no acknowledgment of 
paternity had been filed. An~ I made that 
finding in my rulings and recited the fact 
that that constituted, under our statute, an 
abandonment of the child by the natural 
father so that no further notice need be 
given to him and we coul~ procee~ with the 
adoption without any notice to him. 
I think it is important that we have some 
sort of statutory authority for bringing this 
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sort of a thing to a quick head, that we 
cannot in our society put children out for 
adoption, let them be adopted, give them a 
decree of adoption, only to have the person 
claiming to be the natural father come in and 
say 'I never gave my consent and therefore 
the adoption is not valid and I want my day 
in court'*** It seems to me that there are 
two sides to this coin as there usually is to 
most questions. One is that the mother-, the 
natural mother, who decides to give her child 
up for adoption arranges with a ~hild 
placement agency to place the child and does 
so and they take the child and they place it 
out for adoption; and we protect her identity 
from the adopting parents and we protect 
their identity from other people. So that 
they don't know, in the natural course of 
events, and of course, there are exceptions, 
who the natural parents are or who the 
adoptive parents are. And it seems to me 
that the very birth of the child whose 
mother, because of her circumstances, wants 
to give up the child for adoption rather than 
assume the responsibility of raising the 
child, has some rights to have that decided 
rather quickly and taken care of rather 
quickly. 
And so I think while your case, it may be 
a hardship because of the particular facts of 
the case, I don't think that that is grounds 
for ruling that this statute is 
unconstitutional. I think this court is 
bound by the mandatory language of the 
statute that says 'must be registered'. And 
I think that the facts of the case, or 
whether it comes to me in the pleadings, or 
failure to so allege, or by affidavit, aren't 
crucial where I think it is evident from the 
facts presented here that the acknowledgment 
of paternity was not in fact filed by the man 
claiming to be the natural father within the 
time required by the statute. I think it is 
probably as good a case as we will ever get 
here for letting the Supreme Court pass upon 
that question. But having lived with that 
statute for several years and I think this 
particular section was added in 1975, seeing 
it work and the advantages of the very 
language of the statute in enabling us to 
proceed with adoption matters in the absence 
of the consent of the natural father, I would 
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be reluctant to rule it unconstitutional 
because I don't think it is." 
In re Adoption of Lathrop, 575 P .. 2d 894 {Kan. 1978), 
the Kansas Supreme Court stated that due process and equal 
protection do not require that the consent of a putative father 
be obtained before his child is adopted. The court reasoned that 
if a putative father chooses not to appear and make known his 
desires to care for the child, his rights are de minimus and may 
be terminated without his consent by finalizing the adoption. 
The court further stated that the minimal right must be weighed 
against "a strong state interest in placing children in a stable 
nurturing family atmosphere". The Lathrop case, therefore, holds 
that due process and equal protection· require notice to a 
putative father of a pending adoption only where he has "appeared 
and asserted his desire to care for his child". The decision 
discusses notice to a father whose identity and whereabouts are 
unknown by "constructive notice" given in a form reasonably 
calculated to actually inform him of the adoption while at the 
same time duly protecting the privacy rights of the mother. 
Kansas had not adopted a registration system similar to that of 
Utah and the constitutionality of such a registration system was 
not at issue .. 
The case of Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 60 L. Ed. 
2d. 297, 99 S. Ct. {1979) is cited by Appellant as 
determining that equal protection demands that an unwed father 
can veto the adoption of his child the same as unwed mothers. 
The unwe<i, natural father of two children challenged the 
constitutionality of the New York statute after petition was 
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granted allowing the natural mother and her second husband to 
adopt the children. The natural father had resided with the 
mother and had contributed to the childrens' support for a number 
of years, appeared as the father on their birth certificates, and 
maintained consistent contact with the children after separating 
from the mother. While the Supreme Court of the United States 
held that under such circumstances the permitting of unwed 
mothers, but not unwed fathers, to veto the adoption of a child 
by withholding consent violated the Equal Protection Clause Caban 
is distinguishable from the instant case on its facts. Appellant 
furnished no support or custodial care and had no contact with 
the child, nor had he lived with the mother. The Court at pg. 
307 stated, "In those cases where the father never has come 
forward to participate in the rearing of his child nothing in the 
Equal Protection Clause precludes the State from withholding from 
him the privilege of vetoing the adoption of that child." 
The writer is impressed with the following reasoning of 
Mr. Justice Stevens with whom the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice 
Rehnquist joined in a dissenting opinion. At page 321 of U.S. 
Supreme Court Reports appears the following: 
"Because I consider the course on which the 
Court is currently embarked to be potentially 
most serious, I shall explain why I regard 
its holding in this case as quite narrow. 
The adoption decrees that have been 
entered without the consent of the natural 
father must number in the millions. An 
untold number of family and financial 
decisions have been made in reliance on the 
validity of those decrees. Because the Court 
has crossed a new constitutional frontier 
with today's decision, those reliance 
interests unquestionably foreclose 
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retroactive application of this ruling 
(citing Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 
97, 106-107, 30 L. Ed. 2d 296, 92 Se Ct. 
349)e Families that include adopted children 
need have no concern about the probable 
impact of this case on their familial 
security. 
Nor is there any reason why the decision 
should affect the processing of most future 
adoptions. The fact that an unusual 
application of a state statute has been held 
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds 
does not necessarily eliminate the entire 
statute as a basis for future legitimate 
action. The procedure to be followed in 
cases involving infants who are in the 
custody of their mothers whether solely or 
jointly with the father--or of agencies with 
authority to consent to adoption, is entirely 
unaffected by the courts holding or by its 
reasoning. In fact, as I read the Court's 
opinion, the statutes now in effect may be 
enforced as usual unless 'the adoption of 
older children is sought' ante at 
60 L. Ed. 2d 307 and 'the 
~f-a~t~h-e_r__,,h_a_s~e~stablished a substantial 
relationship with the child and is willing to 
admit his paternity' id. at 60 
L. Ed. 2d 308. State legislatures will no 
doubt promptly revise their adoption laws to 
comply with the rule of this case, but as 
long as state courts are prepared to construe 
their existing statutes to contain a 
requirement of paternal consent 'in cases 
such as this' ibid, I see no reason why they 
mav not continue to enter valid adoption 
decrees in the countless routine cases that 
will arise before statutes can be amended. 
In short, this is an exceptional case 
that should have no effect on the typical 
adoption proceeding. Indeed, I suspect that 
it will affect only a tiny fraction of the 
cases covered by the statutes that must now 
be rewritten. Accordingly, although my 
disagreement with the Court is as profound as 
that fraction is small, I am confident that 
the wisdom of judges will forestall any wide 
spread harm." 
One gathers from reading both the majority and 
dissenting opinions in Caban (which is the latest U.S. Supreme 
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court pronouncement relative to the right of an unwed father to 
block adoption of his child by withholding consent) that both 
Stanley and Caban should be read in. the light of their own 
peculiar facts. 
This court has stated that an unwed mother possesses a 
superior right to custody and control to an unwed father. 
In re Baby Girl M, 25 Ut. 2d 101, 476 P.2d 1013 (1970}. It is in 
the public interest to impose upon one of the parties a legal 
responsibility for the welfare of the child. Since the female is 
present at the birth of the child and identifiable as the mother, 
the state should select the unwed mother rather than the unwed 
father as the parent with legal responsibility. Thus, unequal 
treatment under the law, is not unreasonable. ·Further, 
administrative convenience justifies the use of unequal 
treatment. The child's welfare is of prime consideration and has 
been recognized by the courts. The removal of children from 
adoptive homes following placement may be harmful, and, if 
accomplished frequently enough, will deter qualified and 
deserving prospective parents from applying for an adoptive 
child. The courts are also aware that the uncertainty as to its 
status is not only harmful to the child but also frustrates and 
makes more difficult the work of the adoption agencies," (quoted 
from In re Brennan, 270 Minn. 455, 462, 134 N.W. 2d 126, 131 
(1968)). Prompt placement serves both the child's need for early 
parental care and minimizes detrimental psychological effects. 
The unwed mother's interests are also of great 
importance. She should be shielded from external pressures which 
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force her to relive her experience. Notice requirements or 
hearings are often more harsh on her than on the putative father 
and making her situation public is equivalent to attaching a 
stigma to her in the eyes of the public and her rights to privacy 
are in jeopardy. 
All of the above reasons would argue for a registration 
scheme such as our legislature has enacted which puts the notice 
burden of self-inquiry on the putative father and provides a 
speedy and final determination of his rights in the event of a 
failure to comply with the registration statute. 
II. THE NOTICE OF CLAIM OF PATERNITY 
WAS NOT TIMELY FILED. 
The Utah registration statute requires that the 
putative father must register prior to the date the illegitimate 
child is relinquished or placed with an agency licensed to 
provide adoption services or prior to the filing of a Petition by 
a person with whom the mother has placed the child for adoption. 
That language does not give the putative father an option, but 
rather, requires him to act by a certain event recognizing two 
kinds of adoptions; that is, agency placements and private 
placements. It is apparent that the intent of the legislature 
was to terminate the rights of the putative father upon his 
failure to register prior to the placement of ·the child with a 
licensed agency for the obvious reason that to leave uncertain 
the rights of said putative father following the relinquishment 
to the agency places the agency in a most difficult position, to 
wit~ having to place the child with prospective adoptive parents 
with the question of the putative father's rights still 
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undetermined or, in the alternative, providing care for the child 
at its own expense until the putative father's rights are 
extinguished by a hearing. If, on the other hand, no agency is 
involved and the placement is a private one, the Petition for 
Adoption is, as a matter of practice., filed at approximately the 
time that the child is placed with the proposed adoptive parents 
and constitutes the basis for the award·of temporary custody of 
the child to such par en ts pending the child's residing in_ their 
home the requisite six month period for adoption. In both cases, 
the language of the statute cuts off the rights of the putative 
father prior to the child's being placed in the home of the 
prospective adoptive parents which, it is submitted, is in the 
best interests of the child and subserves public policy. 
Plaintiff-Appellant in the instant case failed to file 
his Notice prior to the relinquishment to a licensed agency. The 
alternative provision of the statute with respect to filing 
"prior to the filing of a Petition by a person with whom 
the mbther has placed the child for adoption". is not operative in 
the instant case. 
Plaintiff-Appellant argues that the language of 78-30-
4 ( 3) ( b) if interpreted in the manner followed by the trial court 
in thii case creates a total absurdity w~en read in connection 
with subsection (d) since the latter section requires the filing 
of a Certificate of Search of the records of the Bureau of Vital 
Statistics signed by its director stating that "a diligent search 
has been made of the registry of no.tices from fathers of 
illegitimate children and that no registration has been found 
pertaining to the father of the illegitimate child in question". 
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It is submitted that there is no conflict in the 
subsections when the two are read in conjunction with subsection 
3(c) which provides that "such failure (to file the notice within 
the_ requisite time) shall further constitute an abandonment of 
said child and a waiver and surrender of any right to notice of 
or to a hearing in any judicial proceeding for the adoption of 
said child and the consent of such father to the adoption of such 
child shall not be required". It is not the filing of the Notice 
of Claim to Paternity that determines the right of the putative 
father to further notice of the proceeding, but the timely filing 
of such notice. Were this not so, the entire statutory scheme 
would be frustrated. 
III. PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAS NOT 
LEGITIMATED AND ADOPTED THE CHILD 
BY PUBLICALLY ACKNOWLEDGING IT AS HIS. 
Title 78-30-12 u.c.A. 1953 as amended provides: 
"The father of an illegitimate child by 
publically acknowleding it as his own, 
receiving it as such with the consent of his 
wife, if he is married, into his family, and 
otherwise treating it as if it were a 
legitimate child, thereby adopts it as such 
and such child is thereupon deemed for all 
purposes legitimate from the time of its 
birth. The foregoing provisions of this 
chapter do not apply to such an adoption." 
Plaintiff-Appellant argues that by advising L.D.S. 
Social Services that he was the father of the child, by filing 
his Notice of Claim of Paternity with the Bureau of Vital 
Statistics, and by filing his verified Complaint in which he 
expresses his desire to brin~ the child into his parents' home 
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and care for it, he has legitimated and adopted the child. The 
statute does not by its terms purport to deal with the situation, 
as here, where the natural mother relinquishes the child to a 
placement agency for adoption. Obviously, under such 
circumstances, the putative father cannot "receive it as such 
(his own) with the consent of his wife, if he is married, into 
his family" nor can he "otherwise treat it as if it were a 
legitimate child." In a footnote in In re Baby Girl M. supra at 
page 1015, it is noted that Section 230 of the Civil Code of 
California is identical to 78-30-12 U.C.A. 1953. The case of 
Darwin v. Ganger, 174 Cal. App. 2d 63, 344 Pac. 2d 353 (1959) is 
cited wherein at page 358 the court stated: 
"Where a man has no wife, he can publically 
acknowledge his child notwithstanding the 
fact that he does not maintain a household 
into which the child is taken. If the man is 
unmarried, the 'family' referred to in 
Section 230 may consist only of the father, 
mother, and child. Thus, an unmarried man 
may legitimize his offspring by living with 
the mother and child for a short period 
during which he represented the mother as his 
wife and the child as his own ***" 
It is obvious that this court in In re Baby Girl M did 
not intend to approve the legitimizing and adopting of a child 
merely by a putative father acknowledging it as his own without 
the "receiving it into his family" which family includes the 
father, a mother and the child. In that case the putative father 
had married the child's mother in 1958 and divorced in 1963 and 
they had intended to remarry but the mother had been so upset by 
the loss of the child that the impending marriage had been 
postponed. During the mother's pregnancy the putative father and 
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natural mother had resided together. Such facts distinguish that 
case from the instant onee The use of the word "family" in the 
statute would indicate that the putative father have a wife or, 
in the alternative, that he create a "family" by at least 1 iv ing 
with the natural mother$ The intent of the statute could hardly 
be stretched so far as to contend that the "family" referred to 
was the "family" consisting of the putative father and his 
parents. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah enacted a registration system for putative fathers 
to meet the possible implications of Stanley v. Illinois decided 
in 1972, which system meets the constitutional test in that the 
notice to the putative father is one of self-inquiry and places 
the burden upon him to come forward and to comply prior to the 
relinquishment of the child by the natural mother to a licensed 
placement agency. The sound public policy reasons for placing 
the burden on the putative father include the desirability of 
protecting the anonymity of the natural mother, the desirability 
of an immediate placement with the proposed adoptive parents, the 
certainty in adoptions where a Certificate of Search indicates no 
claim of paternity having been filed prior to the relinquishment 
of the child to a licensed placement agency, and the practical 
economic benefits of having the proposed adoptive parents assume 
the responsibility for the child immediately upon its release 
from the hospital. The registration system is' effective and 
lends certainty to the adoption process which is necessary if 
-26-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
prospective adoptive parents are not to be deterred from taking a 
child born of an unwed mother into their home. The putative 
father has failed to timely file his claim of paternity in this 
case nor has he complied with the statutory requisites which 
would have legitimated and adopted the child as his own. The 
Order of Dismissal with Prejudice of Plaintiff's Amended 
Complaint for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be affirmed. 
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